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The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must 
not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—
for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.1 
—William J. Brennan Jr., Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 8, 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) issued a report that painted a grim picture of the 
short-term consequences of unmitigated climate change.2 According 
to the report, the Earth’s temperature could increase by as much as 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2040 if greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions continue at current levels.3 Such an increase would kill off 
virtually all coral reefs,4 exacerbate heat waves and wildfires,5 and 
 
Copyright ©2019 Benjamin T. Sharp. 
* J.D. candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2020. The author would like to thank 
Professor Stephen Roady and the editors of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public 
Policy for their assistance in preparing this piece for publication. 
 1.  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
 2.  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers. In: Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above 
Pre-Industrial Levels And Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of 
Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, 
and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty 6 (V. Masson-Delmotte, et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter IPCC 
Report]. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See id. at 10 (“Coral reefs . . . are expected to decline by a further 70–90% at 
1.5°C . . . .”).  
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endanger the global food supply.6 The IPCC report also anticipates 
that such natural disasters could cause political instability in 
developing nations, amplifying the worst effects of the temperature 
changes.7 
These startling findings inspired immediate calls for aggressive 
action. In the United Kingdom, the government asked its Committee 
on Climate Change to investigate whether further action was needed 
to meet the goals set by the Paris Agreement.8 In China, Xie Zhenhua, 
China’s Special Representative of Climate Change Affairs, assured 
colleagues that his country would not “backtrack or renegotiate” on 
the environmental targets agreed to in Paris and restated his nation’s 
commitment to “safeguard[ing] the shared future of humanity.”9 In 
the United States, however, the report did not raise an alarm. When 
asked if he had read the report, President Trump promised to look at 
it but expressed doubts as to its authority.10 
Such disregard for climate change and its causes is typical of 
American politicians. Although ninety-seven percent of scientists 
studying the issue agree that human activities contribute to global 
warming,11 some world leaders continue to refer to the science 
surrounding climate change as “unsettled.”12 Even many who 
acknowledge this consensus, raised questions concerning its 
trustworthiness.13 Politicians frequently insinuate that the availability 
 
 5.  See id. at 13 (predicting temperature increases will increase the occurrence of extreme 
weather events such as heat waves). 
 6.  See id. at 18 (anticipating global temperature increases will reduce crop yields). 
 7.  See id. at 23–24 (predicting governments in developing nations will require assistance 
to mitigate the effects of climate change on infrastructure and national budgets). 
 8.  Memorandum from Roseanna Cunningham, Cabinet Secretary for Environment, 
Climate Change and Land Reform, et al., to Lord Deben, Chairman of Committee on Climate 
Change (Oct. 15, 2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/748489/CCC_commission_for_Paris_Advice_-_Scot__UK.pdf.  
 9.  Li Jing, ‘We Will Not Backtrack or Renegotiate’ Says China’s Top Climate Negotiator, 
CHINA DIALOGUE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/10820-We-will-not-
backtrack-or-renegotiate-says-China-s-top-climate-negotiator/en. 
 10.  Oliver Milman, Trump Quiet as the UN Warns of Climate Change Catastrophe, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/09/trump-climate-
change-report-ipcc-response. 
 11.  See John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in 
the Scientific Literature, 8 ENVTL. RES. LETT. 024024 (2013) (estimating that ninety-seven 
percent of papers expressing an opinion on the issue agreed climate change was attributable to 
human activity). 
 12.  See Brief for Texas and Eleven Additional States as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellant and Urging Reversal at *13, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 18-1170 (2d Cir. Aug. 
10, 2018) (deeming the debate regarding humanity’s effect on climate change to be “unsettled”). 
 13.  See generally Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P. Leaders Came to View 
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of federal funds for climate research affects the objectivity of climate 
research14 and suppresses alternate viewpoints.15 These claims have 
gained traction amongst portions of the American electorate, 
spawning significant political opposition to any action on climate 
change that would stifle economic development.16 As a result, 
members of Congress, wary to do anything that could impair their 
reelection hopes, have struggled to pass meaningful environmental 
legislation.17 
The Executive Branch has faced similar difficulty in generating 
the political will to address climate change. Under President Obama, 
the environmental lobby achieved some victories through executive 
action: most prominent among them, the Obama Administration 
joined nearly every nation on the planet in agreeing to the principles 
set forth by the Paris Climate Accords (“Paris Agreement”).18 The 
provisions of this treaty included “[h]olding the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2˚C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5˚C above pre-
industrial levels.”19 This Agreement was hailed by climate activists as 
“the world’s greatest diplomatic success,”20 but the United States 
 
Climate Change as Fake Science, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/politics/republican-leaders-climate-change.html 
(discussing generally the positions of conservative politicians regarding the validity of climate 
science). 
 14.  See, e.g., Data or Dogma? Promoting Open Inquiry in the Debate Over the Magnitude 
of Human Impact on Earth’s Climate: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Space, Science, and 
Competitiveness of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 114th Cong. 53 
(2015) (statement of Judith A. Curry, Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology) (claiming 
climate scientists have “abandoned any pretense at nonpartisanship and objectivity” in pursuit 
of increased funding). 
 15.  Id. at 33 (statement of John R. Christy, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric 
Science, Univ. of Alabama, Huntsville) (insinuating the authors of IPCC reports use their 
editorial authority to suppress alternative viewpoints). 
 16.  See Gary Langer, Public Backs Action on Global Warming – but With Cost Concerns 
and Muted Urgency, ABC NEWS (July 16, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/public-backs-
action-global-warming-cost-concerns-muted/story?id=56549874 (reporting only fifty-three 
percent of Americans favored immediate action on climate change over more study). 
 17.  See Amber Phillips, Congress’s Long History of Doing Nothing on Climate Change, In 
6 Acts, WASH. POST. (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/ 
2015/12/01/congresss-long-history-of-inaction-on-climate-change-in-6-parts/ 
?utm_term=.8437222181f9 (surveying Congress’s inaction on carbon emissions). 
 18.  Paris Agreement, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2016, 
U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2015/Rev. 1 Apr. 22, 2016 [hereinafter, Paris Agreement], available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement
.pdf. 
 19.  Id. at art. 2(1)(a).  
 20.  Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest Diplomatic 
Success, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015, 2:51 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
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Senate, constitutionally mandated to concur with any treaty before it 
becomes the law of the land,21 saw things differently. 
Because the Senate did not ratify the Paris Agreement, President 
Obama’s signature was only binding upon the United States if the 
executive branch chose to enforce it.22 The drama surrounding 
whether to do so culminated in May of 2018, when President Trump 
announced that the United States would withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement.23 Environmental activists decried the decision as 
“undermin[ing] America’s standing in the world”24 and “a serious 
setback for efforts to staunch the greenhouse gas emissions that are 
overheating the planet,”25 yet they were unable to block the 
administration from taking this step.26 Thus, although progress had 
been made, activists were forced to acknowledge that executive power 
was also insufficient to achieve the sweeping changes to energy policy 
needed to avert the worst effects of climate change.27 
The perceived failures of the political branches to mitigate climate 
change have led climate change activists to seek alternative means to 
achieve reductions in GHG emissions; many are turning to litigation.28 
The claims in these cases rely on a variety of legal bases,29 but this 
 
2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations.   
 21.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds of the Senate to consent to any 
treaty before it holds the force of law). 
 22.  See generally Jack Beerman, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U.L. REV. 947 
(2003) (discussing the frequency with which executive orders are repealed by subsequent 
presidents). 
 23.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 18, art. 28. Due to the terms of the agreement, the 
United States is unable to withdraw until 2020.  
 24.  Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate- 
agreement.html. 
 25.  Jason Mark, Trump’s Paris Withdrawal One Year Later: All Noise, SIERRA CLUB 
(June 1, 2018), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/trump-s-paris-withdrawal-one-year-later-all-
noise. 
 26.  See Shear, supra note 24 (acknowledging “activists . . . failed to change [the 
President’s] mind with an intense, last-minute lobbying blitz.”).  
 27.  See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 223, 225 (2016) (“There is no realistic prospect that sustainable global controls on 
greenhouse gas emissions will be adopted in the next decade. Instead, the global community is 
on track to surpass the one teraton available in the next fifteen to twenty years.”). 
 28.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018); Clean Air Council v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-04977-PD, at 53-57 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 29.  Compare Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss where a fossil fuel company was investigated 
for misleading investors as to its knowledge of the effects of climate change), with Clean Air 
Council v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-04977-PD, at 53-57 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (asserting 
constitutional claims to block deregulatory actions by the Trump administration). 
SHARP_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  3:13 PM 
2019] STEPPING INTO THE BREACH 43 
Note will focus on those cases claiming that governments’ failures to 
prevent climate change amount to violations of the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Rights-based climate change litigation is likely to increase in the 
future. International courts have evidenced a friendliness to this class 
of claims,30 even going so far as to find “a personal constitutional right 
to an environment that is consistent with the human dignity and 
wellbeing of citizens at large.”31 In the United States, however, similar 
efforts have resulted in limited success.32 Among the most prominent 
of the surviving rights-based cases is Juliana v. United States, currently 
awaiting trial in Oregon’s Federal District Court.33 This case presents 
a novel theory known as atmospheric trust litigation,34 which alleges 
that because the Constitution guarantees rights to life and property, 
the government has a duty to protect the natural systems necessary 
for its citizens’ survival.35 
Although creative, some commentators have argued that federal 
courts are unlikely to look favorably on this claim, which some 
consider to be extrajudicial “rights innovation.”36 As referred to in 
 
 30.  See, e.g., Zaaknummer Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396, The Hague Dist. Ct. 
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), 
http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf 
(determining the Dutch government’s inaction on climate change was illegal and ordering them 
to reduce GHG emission by twenty-five percent); Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, No. WP 
No 25501/2015 (Lahore High Court, Sept. 14, 2015), https://elaw.org/system/files/ 
pk.leghari.091415_0.pdf. 
 31.  Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017] IEHC 
695 P 264 (Nov. 21 2017) (finding the government’s “lethargy” in implementing its National 
Climate Change Policy of 2012 violated its citizens’ fundamental rights). 
 32.  Compare Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1263 (D. Or. 2016) (declining 
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ case which alleges that the government’s failure to affirmatively 
mitigate climate change is a violation of the plaintiffs’ right to substantive due process) with 
Farb v. Kansas, No. 12-C-1133, at 6 (D. Kan. June 4, 2013) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim that 
the Kansas government had violated Kansans’ constitutional right to the public trust by failing 
to mitigate climate change). 
 33.  217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).  
 34.  See id. at 1255 n.10 (responding to the plaintiffs’ contention, without holding either 
way, that the atmosphere is a public trust asset); see also Mary Wood, Atmospheric Trust 
Litigation: Securing a Constitutional Right to a Stable Climate System, 29 COLO. NAT. RES., 
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2018) [hereinafter “Atmospheric Trust Litigation”] (describing 
the purposes and theory of atmospheric trust litigation). 
 35.  See id. at 14 (noting that suits brought under this theory draw on the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution). 
 36. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (2018) (noting that “most observers . . . would agree that 
the . . . Roberts Court[] [has] been less likely to innovate new constitutional rights than [its] 
SHARP_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  3:13 PM 
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
this Note, the term “rights innovation” denotes the theory that the 
Constitution’s protection is not limited to the rights enumerated 
therein, but rather may extend to new rights as “new insight reveals 
discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received 
legal structure.”37 The Supreme Court has occasionally seen fit to 
recognize new rights as protected by the Due Process Clause,38 but 
recent changes to the Court’s composition seem unlikely to extend 
this practice.39 
Thankfully for the plaintiffs in Juliana and others like them, the 
United States’ federalist system--which treats the federal government 
and states as dual sovereigns--may provide an alternative path to 
success. This Note argues that climate change litigants may find a 
more plausible and efficacious means of achieving rights-based 
victories under the parallel rights guarantees of individual state 
constitutions. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I evaluates jurisdictional 
barriers to rights-based climate claims. Part II presents the novel 
constitutional claims involved in atmospheric trust litigation and 
analyzes the plaintiffs’ strategy in asserting them. Part III argues 
generally why “rights innovation” of the type advocated in Juliana 
may be better suited to state courts. Part IV notes the limitations of 
making rights-based claims under state constitutions, but argues that 
these issues are ultimately insufficient to overcome its advantages. 
I. THRESHOLD ISSUES: JURISDICTIONAL BARRIERS 
TO RIGHTS-BASED CLIMATE LITIGATION 
Juliana v. United States is no ordinary lawsuit.40 The plaintiffs in 
this action, young people between the ages of eight and nineteen at 
 
forebears.”). 
 37.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (implying the concern for 
“liberty” underlying the Constitution’s explicit language may, at times, require the Court to 
recognize fundamental rights beyond those explicitly enumerated).  
 38.  See, e.g., id. (determining the Due Process Clause protects the right of same-sex 
couples to marry); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, (2010) (holding the 
Due Process Clause protects the right to keep and bear firearms for self-defense). 
 39.  See Stephen S. Trott, Deciding Kavanaugh: Where Do Constitutional Rights Come 
From?, IDAHO STATESMAN (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:39 PM), https://www.idahostatesman.com/ 
opinion/readers-opinion/article217881970.html (describing Justice Kavanaugh as an 
“originalist” and thus, less likely to recognize new constitutional rights via judicial 
interpretation). 
 40.  See 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). 
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the time of trial,41 brought action against the United States, alleging 
that despite the government’s knowledge that the carbon dioxide 
produced by burning fossil fuels was destabilizing the climate in a 
manner that endangered the plaintiffs’ rights to life, liberty, and 
property,42 the defendants “permitted, encouraged, and otherwise 
enabled continued exploitation, production, and combustion of fossil 
fuels.”43 As redress, the plaintiffs seek an injunction directing the 
government to develop a plan to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to 
levels capable of sustaining certain climate conditions.44 In doing so, 
the litigation presents a unique opportunity to redirect the focus of 
the climate debate away from regulation’s potential impacts on 
industry and towards the ramifications of unmitigated climate change 
on posterity. For the court to reach this novel rights claim, however, 
the plaintiffs must overcome considerable procedural barriers. 
The significance of these barriers is manifested by the winding 
path of this litigation. Originally filed in 2015, the case has yet to 
reach trial. The government has twice asked the Supreme Court to 
stay proceedings in the Oregon District Court pending the disposition 
of a petition for a writ of mandamus45 that would direct the District 
Court to dismiss the case.46 Although the Supreme Court denied these 
applications, its July 30, 2018 Order notes that the “breadth” of the 
case’s claims present “substantial grounds” for difference of opinion 
on jurisdictional matters47 and instructs the District Court to take 
these concerns into account in assessing the Government’s dispositive 
motions.48 This Part briefly analyzes two of these issues: Subpart A 
examines challenges the plaintiffs face in establishing Article III 
standing; Subpart B discusses whether climate change presents a 
nonjusticiable political question. 
 
 41.  Id. at 1233. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (“The traditional use of the writ 
in aid of appellate jurisdiction . . . has been to confine [the court against which mandamus is 
sought] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 46.  See Application for a Stay, United States, et al. v. USDC Or., No. 18A65 (July 20, 
2018); Application for a Stay, In re United States of America, et al., No. 18A-410 (Oct. 18, 
2018).  
 47.  Supreme Court Order in United States, et al. v. USDC Or., No. 18A65 (July 20, 2018). 
 48.  Id. 
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A. Standing Doctrine: Adjudicating the Ripeness of Litigation 
In most circumstances, the doctrine of standing, derived from 
Article III of the Constitution, serves as an important constitutional 
constraint on the authority of the federal government.49 By limiting 
the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases where the court can address 
“questions presented in an adversary context and . . . capable of 
resolution through the judicial process,”50 the doctrine ensures that 
only parties involved in justiciable cases and controversies are 
subjected to the coercive powers of the state.51 In practice, the 
doctrine boils down to three elements.52 Plaintiffs seeking federal 
jurisdiction bear the burden of proving injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability.53 The nature of climate change, however, can make 
satisfying these elements uniquely difficult for environmental 
plaintiffs like those in Juliana.54 This subpart considers each element 
of federal standing doctrine in more detail, but also briefly discusses 
the unique challenges awaiting environmental plaintiffs in 
establishing standing. 
1. Injury 
The first component of standing is injury.55 To satisfy this element, 
a plaintiff must have suffered harm that is concrete, particularized,56 
and either actual or imminent.57 In environmental cases, this standard 
requires plaintiffs to show more than a generalized injury to the 
environment: there must be an allegation that the challenged activity 
is either harming or imminently will harm the plaintiff.58 For example, 
a plaintiff may satisfy this element by alleging that the challenged 
activity impairs their economic interests,59 deprives them of 
 
 49.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (acknowledging that 
“standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 
III”). 
 50.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
95 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51.  See id. at 505 (stating that Article III requires that the petitioner establish standing to 
invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts). 
 52.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 53.  Id. at 560–61. 
 54.  See, e.g., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting 
the plaintiffs’ suit on the basis of standing). 
 55.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 56.  Id. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–741, n.16 (1972)).  
 57.  Id. at 560 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
 58.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).  
 59.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007) (finding the potential loss of 
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recreational opportunities,60 or damages a favorite natural aesthetic.61 
This is relatively straightforward in litigation challenging individual 
actions;62 it becomes more difficult, however, when one attempts to 
particularize the harms of worldwide phenomenon like climate 
change. 
The government relied on this argument at Juliana’s motion to 
dismiss stage, asserting that the plaintiffs’ injuries were nonjusticiable 
generalized grievances because climate change affects the entire 
planet.63 A generalized grievance is a suit “claiming only harm to the 
plaintiff’s and every citizen’s interest in the proper application of the 
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and 
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large.”64 Such claims 
are outside of the court’s jurisdiction because they do not present a 
case or controversy, as is required by Article III.65 
The court, however, rejected the government’s premise that 
breadth alone generalized the harm.66 The proper inquiry, it stressed, 
was not whether the injury was “widely shared,” but “whether that 
shared experience caused an injury that is concrete and particular to 
the plaintiff.”67 The Juliana plaintiffs cleared this bar by alleging harm 
to their individual economic, aesthetic, and recreational interests.68 
Thus, although proving injury is an obstacle to the standing of climate 
change litigants, it is not insurmountable if the plaintiffs’ can show 
harm to their interests. 
 
beachfront property due to erosion constituted injury in fact for the purposes of standing). 
 60.  Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1140 (finding a shortened ski season caused by decreased snowpack 
constituted injury in fact). 
 61.  See id. at 1141 (finding that diminished of enjoyment a tree-lined ridge due to 
warming-induced wildfires constituted injury in fact). 
 62.  See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162279, *1 (D. 
Id. September 21, 2018) (challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s sale of certain oil and 
gas leases based on harm to the sage grouse’s natural habitat). 
 63.  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1243 (D. Or. 2016). 
 64.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992). 
 65.  See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014) 
(explaining that the Court’s reluctance to hear cases involving generalized grievances is 
grounded in Article III). 
 66.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1243–44. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See id. at 1244 (determining that under the correct formulation of the generalized 
grievance rule, the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries—e.g., a shortened ski season due to decreased 
snowpack—satisfied the standing’s injury component).   
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2. Causation 
The second component of standing is causation.69 To satisfy this 
element, a plaintiff must show that the alleged injury is “fairly 
traceable” to the challenged action of the defendant and is not the 
result of “the independent action of some third party.”70 Making this 
showing can be particularly difficult for environmental litigants. Given 
the indeterminate number of emitters, the accumulation of GHGs in 
the atmosphere, and the temporal distance between emissions and 
effects, linking “specific climate injuries” to “specific causes” is 
difficult at best.71 
For example, a chain of proximate causation might look like this in 
climate change litigation: (1) the government fails to adequately limit 
GHG emissions by power plants; (2) power plants generate GHG 
emissions, which rise into the atmosphere; (3) over time, these 
emissions accumulate and combine with emissions from vehicles, 
consumers, etc., to warm the earth; (4) this warming causes snowpack 
to melt; (5) the decreased snowpack shortens the ski season, reducing 
the plaintiffs’ recreational opportunities.72 This sort of causal distance 
is not inherently fatal to a plaintiffs’ claim, as courts have been clear 
that a “causal chain does not fail simply because it has several links,” 
but still, “[t]he line of causation . . . must be more than attenuated.”73 
It is unclear, however, where courts draw this line. The court’s 
causation analysis in Juliana typifies this tension. At the motion to 
dismiss stage, the court rejected the government’s insistence that the 
plaintiff’s causation theory was covered by the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 
in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon.74 In Bellon, the 
plaintiffs sought to compel the State of Washington’s regulatory 
agencies to regulate GHGs from five oil refineries that cumulatively 
produced just under six percent of the state’s total GHG emissions.75 
The Ninth Circuit determined the effect of that level of emissions on 
 
 69.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 70.  Id. at 560 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 71.  See Marilyn Averill, Climate Litigation: Ethical Implications and Societal Impacts, 85 
DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 910 (2008) (elaborating on the inherent challenges of adjudicating 
causation in climate change litigation). 
 72.  See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25–28 (2003) (hypothesizing as to what kinds of 
plaintiffs could appropriately bring tort-based climate change claims). 
 73.  Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141–42. (9th Cir. 2013). 
 74.  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1245 (D. Or. 2016) (“This case is 
distinguishable from Bellon . . . .”). 
 75.  Id. at 1143–44. 
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global climate change was “scientifically indiscernible,” and 
concluded that the “causal chain [was] too tenuous to support 
standing.”76 
The court distinguished Juliana’s facts from Bellon’s on two 
grounds. First, the court noted that climate science is constantly 
evolving; thus, a court’s inability to link certain emissions to specific 
effects in 2013 could not be interpreted as “forever clos[ing] the 
courthouse doors to climate change claims.”77 Second, the court 
acknowledged that unlike the emissions challenged in Bellon, those at 
issue in Juliana comprised a significant share of global emissions.78 
The court held that these distinctions were sufficient to justify 
extending the plaintiffs the opportunity to present further evidence.79 
In doing so, the court provided a roadmap for climate change 
litigants to navigate the causation requirement. First, the plaintiffs 
must challenge the actions of a power with the ability to affect a 
statistically significant amount of GHG emissions.80 Second, the 
plaintiffs must scientifically link the effects of said emissions to their 
injuries.81 Although these causal chains may be difficult to prove at 
present, the science of measuring climate change is improving 
rapidly.82 From 2012 to 2015, the number of research groups studying 
whether extreme weather events—such as floods, hurricanes, and 
wildfires—are attributable to climate change has increased fivefold.83 
Furthermore, a 2016 report from the National Academy of Science’s 
 
 76.  Id. at 1144.  
 77.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1245. 
 78.  See id. (noting the plaintiffs allege that “between 1751 and 2014, the United States 
produced more than twenty-five percent of global CO2 emissions.”). 
 79.  See id. at 1246 (“At the pleading stage, plaintiffs have adequately alleged a causal link 
between defendants’ conduct and the asserted injuries.”). 
 80.  See id. (determining Bellon’s reasoning did not apply because it rested on a 
determination that the emissions in controversy were only minor contributors to climate 
change). 
 81.  See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. 582 F.3d 309, 347 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding 
that causation in climate change cases should be determined by “the rigors of evidentiary 
proof”), rev’d on other grounds, Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 429 
(2011). 
 82.  See Kirsten Engel & Johnathan Overpeck, Adaptation and the Courtroom: Judging 
Climate Science, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL & ADMIN L. 1, 25 (2013) (stating “our knowledge of the 
climate is developing at a breakneck pace”). 
 83.  See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, 
ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (The 
National Academies Press 2016) [hereinafter Attribution of Extreme Weather Events]; see also 
IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 6 (predicting severe weather patterns will increase in frequency 
and intensity as the Earth’s temperature rises, perhaps providing scientists additional data to be 
used in developing attribution techniques).  
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Committee on Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change 
Attribution reported that scientists have high or medium confidence 
in their ability to attribute specific wildfires, droughts, extreme 
rainfall, extratropical cyclones, and extreme heat and cold to 
anthropogenic global warming.84 The report also postulates that 
similar research will continue to take place and improve in the 
future;85 thus, it seems possible that climate change litigants may soon 
find more success in attributing their injuries to the effects of global 
warming. 
3. Redressability 
The final component of standing is redressability.86 Redressability 
largely overlaps with the causation component, but the two 
components are distinct: whereas causation “examines the connection 
between the alleged misconduct and injury,” redressability “analyzes 
the connection between the alleged injury and requested judicial 
relief.”87 A single court’s judgment, of course, cannot halt 
anthropogenic global warming. Were a court to order the United 
States government to immediately prohibit all GHG emissions, third 
parties such as China and India would continue to emit greenhouse 
gases at unsustainable levels.88 Fortunately for the Juliana plaintiffs, 
however, standing jurisprudence has shifted away from a literal 
reading of redressability. 
Modern redressability doctrine extends the court’s jurisdiction to 
cases where it has the capacity to affect change, whether total or 
incremental.89 Thus, to satisfy the redressability element, a plaintiff 
must show only that there is a substantial likelihood that the 
requested relief would at minimum “slow or reduce” the harm.90 This 
bodes well for climate change litigants. The shift from literal redress—
 
 84.  IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 9. 
 85.  Id. at 13–16. 
 86.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 87.  Wash. Envt’l. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1146 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Allen v. 
Wright 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19).  
 88.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007) (“[D]eveloping countries such 
as China and India are poised to increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next 
century. . . .”). 
 89.  See Erica D. Kassman, Note: How Local Courts Address Global Problems: The Case of 
Climate Change, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L., 201, 232 (2013) (“the redressability prong 
concerns the court’s ability to effect change.”). 
 90.  See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525 (determining the plaintiffs’ requested relief need 
not reverse climate change so long as it would slow or reduce it) (referencing Larson v. Valente, 
456 U.S. 228, 244 n. 15 (1982)). 
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i.e., completely alleviating a plaintiff’s injury—to symbolic redress—
e.g. requiring an agency to regulate an industry or other emissions—
enables courts to address climate change without exceeding Article 
III’s jurisdictional constraints.91 
Juliana’s reasoning provides evidence of this transition. There, the 
court stated that if the plaintiffs could show that a reduction in the 
emissions controlled by the defendants would reduce GHG 
concentrations and slow climate change, they have satisfied the 
redressability requirement.92 The irreversibility of GHG emissions 
may make such a showing legally and scientifically complex, as 
plaintiffs may be required to show the defendants have the power to 
avert reaching the “point of no return, beyond which climate change’s 
irreversible consequences become inevitable,” without cooperation 
from third parties.93 But, as noted above, the progress of climate 
science should simplify this analysis in the future.94 
4. Conclusions on Standing Doctrine 
Article III standing represents a serious, but not insurmountable, 
obstacle to climate change claims in federal court. Climate change, 
with its latent effects caused by decades of cumulative emissions, does 
not fit neatly into existing standing doctrine. Proving each of its three 
elements is challenging and often requires expensive expert 
testimony.95 As a result, many seemingly legitimate claims will 
inevitably fail before courts may consider their merits.96 This result, 
however, is not necessarily a “flaw in the system”; an inescapable 
result of any standing doctrine application is that at least some 
disputes will not receive judicial review.”97 Still, although navigating it 
may be extraordinarily complex, Juliana makes clear that there is a 
 
 91.  See Kassman, supra note 89, at 232–40 (discussing Article III’s redressability 
requirement in the context of climate change litigation). 
 92.  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1247 (D. Or. 2016) (determining the 
plaintiffs had carried their burden for redressability at the motion-to-dismiss stage of the 
litigation). 
 93.  See id. (implying plaintiffs may be unlikely to satisfy the redressability prong if the 
harms to be brought by climate change are inevitable and declining to acknowledge the value of 
delayed onset). 
 94.  See supra text accompanying note 82.  
 95.  See supra Part I(A) (1–3) (discussing the obstacles posed to climate change litigants by 
each element of the Article III standing analysis). 
 96.  See, e.g., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(concluding the plaintiffs failed to meet Article III’s standing requirements and thus the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of their claims). 
 97.  Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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path to Article III standing for climate change litigants. 
B. The Political Question Doctrine: Separation of Powers as a 
Jurisdictional Limitation 
At its heart, the political question doctrine is a function of the 
separation of powers. The doctrine, first articulated by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison98 serves to ensure that the judicial 
branch does not interfere with the functions of the political branches 
by deciding questions “in their nature political, or which are, by the 
Constitution and laws, submitted to the executive.”99 Consequently, if 
an issue is found to be “political,” it is imperative that a court respect 
its coordinate branches and deem the issue nonjusticiable.100 The 
scope of this limitation, however, is frequently litigated. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville observed in his seminal work Democracy in America, 
“[scarcely] any political question arises in the United States that is not 
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”101 Thus, 
determining whether a question is political is rarely straightforward. 
To assist courts in this task, the Supreme Court has identified six 
indicators of a political question. These factors, commonly known as 
the Baker test, are: 
(1) A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.102 
Despite ample litigation as to the applicability of these formulations, 
the Supreme Court has only rarely determined that a political 
 
 98.  5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803). 
 99.  Id. at 170. 
 100.  See generally Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194–96 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing 
the Constitution’s allocation of authority between the three branches of government). 
 101.  1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
1945).  
 102.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1236 (D. Or. 2016) (quoting Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
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question barred adjudication.103 The bar for dismissal is high, requiring 
one of the formulations to be “inextricable from the case at bar.”104 
As a result, federal courts have regularly adjudicated claims 
involving politically charged issues.105 Climate change is certainly 
“political” in that it has motivated intense partisan debate and 
appeared as a platform item for major political parties.106 
Nevertheless, as the court in Juliana noted, the political question 
doctrine does not bar adjudication merely because a case “raises an 
issue of great importance to the political branches.”107 Instead, courts 
must undertake a rigorous factual analysis before concluding a 
controversy is nonjusticiable.108 In three sections, this subpart 
summarizes the Juliana court’s analysis and then analogizes its 
findings to climate change litigants more generally. 
1. The First Baker Factor: Textual Commitments 
The first Baker factor counsels dismissal if a case would require a 
court to decide “an issue whose resolution is textually committed to a 
coordinate political department”109 and ruling thereon would require 
the court to second-guess another branch’s decisions.110 In general, the 
Supreme Court has been loath to find such “textual commitments,” 
but the rulings in which it has done so followed two paths. The Court’s 
decision in Davis v. Passman is emblematic of the first path.111 There, 
the Court characterized the Speech or Debate Clause as a “paradigm 
 
 103.  See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine & the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 267–68 (2002) (stating the 
Court has only twice found an issue to be a political question, and “both [instances] involved 
strong textual anchors for finding a constitutional question rested with the political branches”).  
 104.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (emphasis added). 
 105.  See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (examining the constitutionality of an 
executive order barring the entrance of foreign nationals from certain Muslim majority nations); 
Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (adjudicating whether the government’s refusal 
to facilitate an abortion procedure for an alien minor in federal custody constituted an undue 
burden). 
 106.  See, e.g., Democratic National Committee, Party Platform, Environmental Justice, 
DEMOCRATS.COM, https://democrats.org/about/party-platform/#environment (last visited Feb. 
13, 2019). 
 107.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (quoting United States Dep’t of Commerce v. 
Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992)). 
 108.  See generally Baker, 369 U.S. 217 (enunciating the federal political question doctrine). 
 109.  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 202 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(referencing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
 110.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1238 (“The question is whether adjudicating a claim 
would require the Judicial Branch to second-guess decisions committed exclusively to another 
branch of government.”). 
 111.  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
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example” of a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment.”112 
In providing that members of Congress “shall not be questioned in 
any other place” for “any speech or debate in either House,”113 the 
Clause shields statements made during the business of Congress from 
any sort of judicial review.114 Thereby, it directly enforces the 
separation of powers.115 
The second path holds that if a power is fundamental to the 
exercise of an enumerated power, it may also be textually committed. 
The Court’s decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry is a prime example of this 
reasoning.116 There, the Court held that the Constitution gives the 
President exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments.117 
Although the Constitution never uses the term “recognition,” the 
Court determined that the Constitution’s structure granted the office 
this authority because without it the President would be unable to 
manifest the constitutional authority to receive ambassadors and to 
negotiate treaties.118 
Neither of these paths is particularly troublesome for climate 
change litigants. First, it is unlikely that courts will find an explicit 
textual basis for declaring the matter political. As the court noted in 
Juliana, “the Constitution does not mention environmental policy, 
atmospheric emissions, or global warming.”119 Courts also seem 
unlikely to find that crafting climate change policy is a “fundamental 
power on which any other power . . . rests.”120 The Constitution does 
give the political branches authority over commerce, foreign relations, 
and federal land—all areas affected by climate change.121 According to 
the Juliana court, however, the inquiry is not whether a judicial 
decision would implicate a power granted to the political branches; 
were this the case, all executive and legislative action would be 
immune from judicial review.122 Rather, the proper inquiry is 
 
 112.  Id. at 235 n. 11 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
 113.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. 
 114.  See Davis, 442 U.S. at 235 n.11 (acknowledging “the Speech and Debate Clause speaks 
directly to . . . separation-of-powers concerns”) 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See generally 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 117.  Id. at 2086. 
 118.  Id. at 2084–86 (finding that because recognition was “a topic on which the nation must 
speak with one voice,” that power must be vested in the executive). 
 119.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1237 (D. Or. 2016). 
 120.  Id. at 1237–38. 
 121.  See id. at 1237. 
 122.  See id. at 1238 (“[T]he question is not whether a case implicates issues that appear in 
the portion of the Constitution allocating power to the Legislative and Executive Branches – 
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narrower, requiring courts to determine whether adjudicating a claim 
would oblige the judicial branch to “second-guess decisions 
committed exclusively to another branch.”123 In Juliana, the court 
determined climate change was not such an issue.124 
2. The Second & Third Baker Factors: Judicial Competence 
The second and third Baker factors counsel dismissal if a case 
would require a court to make policy determinations beyond its 
competence.125 Generally, courts have interpreted this factor to mean 
that a case must involve the “application of some manageable and 
cognizable standard within the competence of the Judiciary to 
ascertain and employ to the facts.”126 If no such standard is given, or a 
court cannot determine such a standard in the absence of a yet-
unmade policy determination, then resolution of the suit is beyond 
the reach of the judiciary.127 For example, in Vieth v. Jubelirer128 the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of political 
gerrymandering in Pennsylvania.129 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Scalia acknowledged the Constitution’s general policy of preventing 
political gerrymandering,130 but ultimately determined the case was 
nonjusticiable due to the absence of a judicially manageable standard 
against which to judge the defendant’s actions.131 Such reasoning 
typifies these decisions; thus, in cases involving controversial issues, 
articulating a judicially discernible and manageable standard is a 
prerequisite to success. 
According to the Oregon district court, the plaintiffs articulated 
such a standard in Juliana by alleging infringement of their due 
 
such a test would, by definition, shield nearly all legislative and executive action from legal 
challenge.”). 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  See id. (finding “[t]he first Baker factor does not apply.”). 
 125.  See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 203 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The 
second and third Baker factors reflect circumstances in which a dispute calls for decision-making 
beyond courts’ competence.”). 
 126.  Id. at 204. 
 127.  See id. (stating suits that require the judicial branch to make policy determinations are 
“beyond the judicial role envisioned by Article III”) (referencing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 
1, 10 (1973); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). 
 128.  541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 129.  Id. at 271. 
 130.  See id. at 275–76 (surveying evidence of the founders’ desire to prevent political 
gerrymandering in the legislative history of Article I, § 4 of the Constitution).  
 131.  See id. at 281 (“No judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating 
political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political 
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.”). 
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process rights.132 This inquiry did not require the court to pinpoint a 
level of GHG emissions that would best balance competing economic 
and environmental concerns, a decidedly political task.133 Instead, it 
required the court to determine only an emissions level that would 
prevent further harm.134 Although admittedly complex, this standard 
would provide a framework by which the court could evaluate the 
plaintiffs’ claims, the touchstone of justiciability.135 
Furthermore, this standard is enforceable without requiring the 
court to direct individual agency actions.136 The plaintiffs did not seek 
any particular regulation.137 Instead, they asked the court to require 
the government to develop “an enforceable national remedial plan” 
to redress the harms suffered.138 This remedy would not necessarily 
require the court to direct how the government reaches its targets, but 
only mandate that it does so.139 Thus, like the first factor, the second 
and third factors of the Baker test do not reveal a political question. 
3. The Fourth through Sixth Baker Factors: Judicial Prudence 
The fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors require dismissal if 
prudence “may counsel against a court’s resolution of an issue 
presented.”140 Generally, these final factors have applied only in cases 
where the initial resolution is better suited to another time or forum 
or where resolving the issue could be deemed disrespectful to a 
political branch.141 Only in exceptional cases, however, have these 
“final factors alone render[ed] a case nonjusticiable.”142 
 
 132.  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1240 (D. Or. 2016) (determining 
that neither the second nor the third Baker factors divested the court’s jurisdiction because 
“[e]very day, federal courts apply the legal standards governing due process claims”). 
 133.  See id. at 1238–39 (explaining the plaintiffs did not ask the court to pinpoint a “best” 
emissions level). 
 134.  See id. at 1239 (analyzing the plaintiffs’ claims under prongs two and three of the Baker 
test). 
 135.  See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 555 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining a case 
does not present a political question if “a legal framework exists by which courts can 
evaluate . . . [its] claims in a reasoned manner”) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278). 
 136.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1239. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint at 94). 
 139.  See id. (asserting the court could remedy the plaintiffs’ harm “without directing an 
individual agency to take any particular action.”). 
 140.  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 206–07 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 141.  See id. (2012) (listing the rare circumstances in which the fourth through sixth Baker 
factors have been found to apply). 
 142.  Id. at 207. 
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Only the fourth Baker factor was raised by the defendants in 
Juliana.143 This factor is relevant in cases where ruling “would 
contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited 
contexts where such contradiction would seriously interfere with 
important governmental interests.”144 The defendants contended that 
this factor prevents courts from addressing violations of constitutional 
rights if the government has taken some step to mitigate this 
damage.145 The court, however, rejected this broad formulation, and 
instead interpreted the rule as barring adjudication only when judicial 
resolution would be “wholly incompatible” with the decision of a 
political branch.146 It went on to assert that a judicial remedy in 
Juliana would be “fully consistent” with the United States’ efforts to 
prevent climate change given it would likely go beyond the United 
States’ standing commitments to reduce GHG emissions.147 
4. Conclusions on the Political Question Doctrine 
Like Article III standing, the political question doctrine presents a 
serious obstacle for climate change litigants. Regardless of the validity 
of individual claims, the political rhetoric surrounding the issue will 
lead many courts, right or wrong, to take caution and declare these 
claims nonjusticiable.148 The Juliana court, however, rejected this 
trend.149 In dispatching the defendants’ arguments for the political 
question doctrine’s applicability in cases involving climate change, the 
court again laid out a roadmap for future litigants. Not all its 
arguments, however, are equally convincing. 
Specifically, its justification for the fourth Baker factor’s 
inapplicability, that its judicial determination would “more 
aggressively” reduce GHG emissions and thus did not contradict the 
executive branch’s policy decisions,150 seems tenuous at best. Whether 
 
 143.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1239 (“Neither intervenors nor defendants suggest the 
fifth or sixth Baker factors apply here.”). 
 144.  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 145.  Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1240. 
 146.  See id. (“[F]ederal appellate courts have found the fourth Baker factor present when 
judicial adjudication . . . would be wholly incompatible with . . . [a] decision[] made by one of the 
political branches.”). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(noting that climate change was a “patently” political issue and “transcendently legislative” in 
nature), overturned by Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 149.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241 (“There is no need to step outside the core role of 
the judiciary to decide this case.”). 
 150.  See id. at 1240–41 (“There is no contradiction between promising other nations the 
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to more aggressively reduce climate change is hotly debated 
throughout American society. A Washington Post poll, taken shortly 
after President Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris 
Climate Accords, revealed that although sixty-nine percent of 
Americans favored regulation of carbon emissions, a majority of 
citizens in energy-producing states—such as West Virginia, Texas, and 
North Dakota—opposed such regulation.151 Thus, Judge Aiken’s 
determination that additional regulation would be consistent with, 
rather than opposed to, the existing political decisions of the United 
States seems suspect.152 
Regardless, climate change litigants are sure to face this type of 
challenge in federal court. Plaintiffs can prepare for this obstacle by 
articulating a judicially cognizable standard and providing evidence 
showing a judicial decision would be line with, rather than 
contradictory to, previous decisions of the executive branch,153 but 
even then, the likelihood of navigating it successfully will still largely 
depend upon individual judges and courts.154 
C. Conclusions on Threshold Jurisdictional Barriers Affecting 
Climate Change Litigants 
Climate change litigants face significant jurisdictional barriers to 
even being heard in federal court. Cases like Juliana involve complex 
factual determinations, consume inordinate amounts of time, and 
attract troublesome media attention. Thus, courts have every incentive 
to try to resolve them as quickly as possible; in many cases, this will 
involve finding threshold issues such as the standing and political 
question doctrines dispositive. 
 
United States will reduce CO2 emissions and . . . more aggressively reduc[ing] CO2 emissions.”). 
 151.  Lyle Scruggs & Clifford Vickrey, Most Americans Support Government Regulation to 




 152.  See supra Part I(B)(3) (concluding the fourth Baker factor did not bar adjudication 
because additional regulation would go beyond the United States standing commitments). 
 153.  See supra part I(B)(2); I(B)(3). 
 154.  See Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in CLIMATE CHANGE READER 152 
(W.H. Rodgers, Jr. and M. Robinson-Dorn, eds. 2011) [hereinafter Climate Change Reader] 
(anticipating that “[h]anded the right complaint, there will be judges who recognize this epochal 
moment in the course of human civilization and exert their common law authority to protect the 
globe’s atmosphere – and the billions of people dependent on it for all time to come”).  
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Juliana though, if nothing else, stands for the fact that these 
obstacles are not insurmountable. With a sympathetic judge, creativity, 
and patience, climate change litigants can have their claims heard on 
the merits in federal court. Success there, however, presents a new set 
of obstacles, and perhaps none is more daunting than articulating a 
legal basis for the government’s liability for the harms the Juliana 
plaintiffs allegedly suffered. 
II. STATE CREATED DANGER: MANUFACTURING A JUDICIAL 
OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The plaintiffs’ claims rely upon a novel interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause155: namely, that it protects a fundamental right to a 
climate system capable of sustaining human life.156 Fundamental rights 
are examined under strict scrutiny, meaning government action 
infringing such rights is invalid unless the government can prove that 
the action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.157 
No doubt a great deal of judicial and scholarly attention will be 
devoted to the merits of this claim, but this Note does not address 
these questions and assumes that such a right is desirable.158 This Part 
summarizes the theory underlying a constitutional right to certain 
climate conditions, then discusses the plaintiffs’ strategy in asserting 
that constitutional right. 
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the federal 
government from depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property” 
 
 155.  See supra Part I.  
 156.  See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016) (“Exercising my 
‘reasoned judgement,’ I have no doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining 
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015)).  
 157.  Id. at 1248─49 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
 158.  For a discussion of the merits of such a right, see Michael C. Blumm & Mary C. Wood, 
“No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1 (2017) (exploring the Juliana court’s due process ruling and the concept of 
fundamental rights in American constitutional law before describing the Juliana decision as a 
logical extension of existing jurisprudence); see also Atmospheric Trust Litigation, supra note 
34, at 321 (explaining that a fundamental right to a climate capable of sustaining life extends 
from natural law theory that the earth is the property of all people and its health is a necessary 
prerequisite to human life). The concept has also engendered opposition. See Mark W. Smith, 
Founder, Smith Valliere PLLC, Address at The Federalist Society National Lawyers 
Convention: Climate Change Nuisance Suits (Nov. 17, 2018), 
https://fedsoc.org/conferences/2018-national-lawyers-convention#agenda-item-climate-change-
nuisance-suits (describing atmospheric trust and other climate change focused lawsuits as an 
attempt to “rollback” the industrial revolution). 
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without “due process of law.”159 When a plaintiff challenges 
affirmative government action under this clause, the threshold inquiry 
is the applicable level of scrutiny.160 Rational basis review is the 
default level of scrutiny,161 but if the government infringes a 
“fundamental right,” the reviewing court will apply strict scrutiny.162 
Under strict scrutiny, a government action will be declared invalid 
unless it “is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”163 
Fundamental liberties include rights enumerated in the 
Constitution—e.g., the right to keep and bear firearms for self-
defense164—as well as rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition” or “fundamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty.”165 This second category has served as the basis for many of 
the Supreme Court’s most controversial decisions,166 and the plaintiffs’ 
argument in Juliana draws on this tradition. 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Obergefell v. 
Hodges—i.e., that the Constitution’s meaning is yet unknown but 
discoverable through the exercise of reasoned judgement regarding 
which unenumerated rights might be necessary to the exercise of 
other rights167—the district court determined that a stable climate 
system was “quite literally the foundation” of civilized society.168 As 
such, any government action that impaired the plaintiffs’ right to such 
a climate system is subject to strict scrutiny.169 
 
 159.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 160.  See Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 365 (1988) (stipulating that courts are obliged to 
decide whether a government action should be reviewed under rational-basis review or a stricter 
standard depending on the nature of the right infringed). 
 161.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249 (postulating that the government’s “affirmative 
actions would survive rational basis review” before analyzing them under the more rigorous 
standard reserved for fundamental rights). 
 162.  Id. at 817. 
 163.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
 164.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (holding that the second 
amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense).  
 165.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (internal citations, 
quotations, and emphasis omitted). 
 166.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (recognizing the Due Process 
Clause protects a fundamental right to gay marriage); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (determining the Due Process Clause protects the 
right to an abortion under most circumstances). 
 167.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249–50 (summarizing Obergefell’s reasoning as “[t]he 
idea is that certain rights may be necessary to enable the exercise of other rights, whether 
enumerated or unenumerated”). 
 168.  Id. at 1250. 
 169.  See id. at 1248 (“Substantive due process forbids the government to infringe certain 
fundamental liberty interests at all . . . .” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)) 
(internal quotations, and emphasis omitted)). 
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The strategy behind the plaintiffs’ decision to challenge the 
government’s inaction under this theory is not immediately clear. The 
Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative action on the 
government to act, even when “such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty, or property interests.”170 This rule, however, is subject to 
an exception if the government “places a person in peril [with] 
deliberate indifference to their safety.”171 Were the plaintiffs able to 
establish the government’s apathy towards them, the court could act 
in equity to develop and enforce whatever remedy it deemed 
necessary to mitigate further infringement of their civil rights.172 
The flexible nature of this remedy is particularly attractive to 
climate change litigants as in Juliana. As discussed above,173 courts 
must take care to avoid invading the province of the political 
branches, and a declaratory judgment may be an effective means of 
doing so. First, a declaratory judgment avoids separation of powers 
issues.174 By merely declaring that a violation has occurred and that it 
must be remedied, a declaratory judgment does not ask the court to 
make value judgments—a task better suited to the political 
branches—as to how this should be accomplished.175 Instead, the court 
would only need to ensure the political branches are taking 
appropriate steps to reach the mandated targets. Additionally, a 
declaratory judgment could be used as persuasive authority in other 
jurisdictions, providing citizens conceptual tools to bring similar suits 
against their own governments.176 Finally, a declaratory judgment 
would be accompanied by injunctive relief,177 opening the possibility 
of imposing affirmative obligations upon the government to remedy 
 
 170.  Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).  
 171.  Id. at 197 (acknowledging that had the state created the situation in question, it may 
have acquired an affirmative duty “enforceable through the Due Process Clause”). 
 172.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (empowering citizens of the United States, whose rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution have been deprived, to bring suits in 
equity of any other proceeding proper for redress); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 8 (1836) (“[C]ases must occur to which the antecedent rules cannot be 
applied without injustice, or to which they cannot be applied at all.”).  
 173.  See supra Part I (concerning the political question doctrine). 
 174.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241–42 (discussing the care courts must take to avoid 
separation-of-powers problems in crafting remedies). 
 175.  See id. at 1241 (“[S]eparation of powers might . . . permit the Court to direct 
defendants to ameliorate plaintiffs’ injuries but limit its ability to specify precisely how to do 
so.”). 
 176.  See Climate Change Reader, supra note 154, at 5. 
 177.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233 (detailing the plaintiffs’ requested remedies, 
including an order enjoining the defendants’ violations of their civil rights and directing them to 
develop a plan to reduce emissions). 
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climate change. In view of these advantages, the Juliana plaintiffs’ 
shrewdness in challenging the government’s inaction on climate 
change as a violation of their civil rights becomes clear. 
The probability of receiving such relief, however, is rather low. As 
the court in Juliana acknowledged, the Supreme Court has instructed 
federal courts to “exercise the utmost care” when asked to recognize 
new rights as encompassed by the due process clause,178 and its recent 
decisions exhibit this caution. For example, in Washington v. 
Glucksberg179 the Court declined to recognize a substantive due 
process violation when state law forbade assisted suicide, citing the 
importance of prudence in adjudicating issues of great public 
interest.180 In view of this caution, as well as the massive economic 
implications of the plaintiffs’ desired right,181 the Oregon district 
court’s decision to recognize the right to a climate capable of 
sustaining human life as “fundamental” is sure to be robustly 
challenged,182 and its likelihood of survival on appeal seems slim.183 
An appellate ruling denying the existence of this right would 
likely deal a fatal blow to this sort of rights-based litigation in federal 
court. If such a result does occur, climate change plaintiffs would be 
forced to again think creatively about how they might engage 
governmental mechanisms to prevent further damage to the 
atmosphere. Part III advocates for one possibility, arguing that climate 
change litigants may find a plausible means of achieving rights-based 
victories under the parallel rights guarantees of individual state 
constitutions. 
 
 178.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citation omitted). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See id. at 735 (holding Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 181.  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1267 (concluding the intractability of climate debates in 
Congress is in part caused by short term economic interests.). 
 182.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. USDC Or. 2 (July 20, 2017) 
(deeming the Juliana court’s due process ruling a “clear error”); see also Del. Riverkeeper 
Network v. FERC, 895 F.3d 102, 108 (2018) (denying the existence of a federally protected 
liberty interest in a “healthy environment”). 
 183.  See Order in United States, et al. v. USDC Or., No. 18A65 (July 30, 2018) 
(acknowledging the case raises issues about which there is a substantial room for differences of 
opinion). 
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III. STATE CONSTITUTIONS: AN UNDERUTILIZED MEANS OF 
SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS 
In one of the most widely read law review articles of all time,184 
Justice William Brennan lauded state law as an “independent 
protective force” without which “the full realization of our liberties 
cannot be guaranteed.”185 A leader of the Court’s liberal wing, Justice 
Brennan may at first seem an unlikely person to have made such a 
statement. After all, the late Justice was a decisive vote in many of the 
Court’s decisions to strike down state laws for violating Constitutional 
rights guarantees.186 The article, however, was written as the Court 
began to pull back from its enforcement of the Boyd principle187 and 
restrain its application of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.188 
Recognizing this trend,189 Brennan urged state courts—as an 
outworking of federalism—to join “the struggle to protect the people . 
. . from governmental intrusion on their freedoms” by “expand[ing] 
constitutional protections.”190 Because many state constitutions 
guarantee rights similar to, if not in excess of, those of the federal 
Constitution,191 Justice Brennan implored state courts to interpret 
these provisions liberally, finding therein whatever rights may be 
necessary to secure justice.192 
 
 184.  See Sutton, supra note 36, at 9. 
 185.  See Brennan, supra note 1, at 491. 
 186.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (disallowing many state restrictions on 
abortion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (imposing a moratorium on states practicing 
the death penalty until such a time as they could remove arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement). 
 187.  See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (announcing that “constitutional 
provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed . . . .”). The 
Boyd principle refers to the notion that rights guarantees should be construed liberally to 
protect from infringement at the micro level. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 495. 
 188.  See Brennan, supra note 1, at 495 (hypothesizing that state courts are enforcing state 
rights guarantees more liberally because the Supreme Court has chosen to construe federal 
guarantees narrowly).  
 189.  See id. at 502 (“[T]he Court has condoned both isolated and systematic violations of 
civil liberties.”) (citations omitted). 
 190.  Id. at 503. 
 191.  See Sutton, supra note 36, at 1 (“[I]t is the rare guarantee of any significance that 
appears just in the National Constitution as opposed to most (if not all) of the state 
constitutions.”); see also infra note 220 (listing state constitutional provisions protecting 
environmental rights). 
 192.  See Brennan, supra note 1, at 502 (denouncing the Supreme Court’s decisions for 
“hardly bespeak[ing] a concern for equity”). 
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In Juliana, the plaintiffs asked the court to constitutionalize such a 
right.193 In his book, 51 Imperfect Solutions, Judge Jeffrey Sutton, of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, argues that 
for several reasons, state courts are a superior venue for this type of 
“rights innovation.”194 First, states can premise interpretations of 
rights guarantees on local conditions and traditions.195 Second, an ill-
conceived state-level constitutional decision is easier to correct than a 
federal-level decision.196 Third, states may have constitutional 
provisions more “on point” than those in the federal Constitution.197 
Fourth, many states guarantee appellate review.198 Fifth, advancing 
new constitutional rights in state courts may facilitate the 
development of federal constitutional law.199 Finally, climate change 
litigants may find the jurisdictional barriers to having their claims 
heard are significantly lower in state courts.200 This Part addresses 
each of these factors in turn, arguing that state courts should be more 
willing to engage with the Juliana plaintiffs’ novel rights claims, and 
for that reason present better odds for achieving incremental gains in 
the fight against climate change. 
A. State Courts May Adapt Their Rulings to Local Conditions 
Any articulation of a new constitutional right also requires its 
management.201 All judges must weigh the future implications of a 
ruling when dealing with the case before them.202 This is especially 
true when judges consider identifying a new constitutional right at the 
 
 193.  See Juliana v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 3d. 1224, 1248 (D. Or. 2016) (“Plaintiffs 
allege defendants have violated their due process rights by ‘directly caus[ing] atmospheric 
CO2 to rise . . . .’”). 
 194.  See Sutton, supra note 36, at 16 (noting federal courts “face[] several disadvantages 
relative to the state courts when it comes to defining constitutional rights”). 
 195.  Id. at 17. 
 196.  Id. at 18. 
 197.  Id. at 19. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  See Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J. 
EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES. L. 349, 398 (2015) (concluding that federal doctrine 
influences, but does not control, standing analysis in state courts); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts 
and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1863 
(2001) (noting that state courts “hear an array of questions that would be nonjusticiable under 
federal law”). 
 201.  See Sutton, supra note 36, at 17. 
 202.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by their Rulings, Should 
Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007) (arguing judges should weigh public opinion in 
adjudicating cases). 
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federal level,203 which affects fifty-one different jurisdictions. This 
reality prevents the Supreme Court from allowing local traditions and 
conditions to guide its interpretation of constitutional guarantees and 
the remedies imposed to implement them.204 State constitutions, on 
the other hand, are born of these differences.205 Thus, they are better 
able, and more likely, to consider the unique history and traditions of 
jurisdiction in constitutional rulings, making them better suited to 
rights innovation.206 
In the context of climate change, many states have long traditions 
of environmental activism, and each state has unique economic and 
geographic features that could guide a court’s hand in protecting 
environmental rights under its state constitution.207 For example, the 
environmental provision of Rhode Island’s state constitution contains 
protections rooted in hundreds of years of fishing and shore rights 
long enjoyed by its people.208 The provision begins specifically, 
protecting the people’s access to the “rights of fishery and the 
privileges of the shore.”209 It then, however, becomes quite broad, 
directing the state “to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to 
protect the natural environment,”210 protections rooted in the 
entitlements of the King Charles Charter, which governed the state 
until the Rhode Island Constitution of 1842.211 Thus, although Rhode 
Island’s environmental provision was not passed until 1987,212 its 
protections take into account hundreds of years of tradition. Federal 
law, given the breadth of its jurisdiction, is simply incapable of such 
nuance. 
 
 203.  See Sutton, supra note 36, at 17. 
 204.  Id.  
 205.  See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973) (taking into account states’ unique 
histories and cultures in acknowledging “[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to 
read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public 
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City”). 
 206.  See id. 
 207.  See infra note 217 and accompanying discussion (listing states whose constitutions 
protect environmental rights in to some degree). 
 208.  See Art English & John J. Carroll, State Constitutions and Environmental Bills of 
Rights, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2015 18, 20 (The Council of State Governments ed., 2015). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 211.  See English & Carroll, supra note 208. 
 212.  Id. 
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B. State Constitutions May Be Simpler to Amend 
State constitutional law is also more amendable than its federal 
counterpart. Thus, in the event a new constitutional right is 
undesirable to the electorate, citizens have several remedies at their 
disposal to correct the issue. For example, many states have 
straightforward constitutional amendment processes as compared to 
the federal government.213 Additionally, many states hold judicial 
elections.214 The availability of these remedies gives state courts more 
freedom to “try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”215 
In the context of climate change, this may increase the likelihood 
of state courts’ recognizing environmental rights as protected by their 
state constitutions. State courts may be more willing to create rights to 
particular climate conditions if they know their results are not 
permanent if undesirable to the electorate. On the other hand, 
judicially enforceable environmental rights are attractive, in part, 
precisely because they are insulated from the political branches, which 
may be unduly influenced by outside interests. Thus, although the 
possibility of rescission may increase environmental plaintiffs’ chances 
of succeeding on the merits, it may also jeopardize the permanence of 
these victories. 
C. State Constitutions May Have Provisions on Point 
A further distinction of note: state constitutions often contain 
different clauses or substantive content than those in the federal 
Constitution.216 These clauses may provide an opportunity for relief 
that would otherwise be unavailable. In the context of climate change, 
several state constitutions contain provisions explicitly protecting its 
citizens right to certain climate conditions.217 The Pennsylvania 
 
 213.  See Ballotopedia, Amending State Constitutions, BALLOTPEDIA.ORG, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Amending_state_constitutions (surveying the procedures for amending 
each state’s constitution). 
 214.  See generally JED H. SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012) (discussing the purpose and effects of judicial elections on 
lawmaking and judicial accountability).  
 215.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 216.  Sutton, supra note 36, at 19; see also infra note 217 (listing environmental provisions 
contained in state constitutions).  
 217.  For example, many states have included environmental rights provisions in their state 
constitutions, although their enforcement mechanisms vary. See, e.g., Haw. CONST. art. XI, § 9; 
Ill. CONST. art. XI; Mass. CONST. art. 97; Mont. CONST. Art II, § 3; Pa. CONST. art. I, § 27; R.I. 
CONST. art. I, § 17. 
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Environmental Rights Amendment, for example, guarantees its 
citizens the right to clean air, pure water, and the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic values of the environment.218 
Although environmental litigants have only found limited success 
when litigating under this and other similar provisions,219 their 
existence alone engenders strategies unavailable to those operating 
under the federal constitution. Furthermore, these amendments could 
serve as persuasive evidence to federal courts of a broad base of 
support for rights innovation of the type advocated by Juliana’s 
plaintiffs.220 
D. Bringing Claims in State Courts Highlights the (Im)Possibility of 
Appellate Review 
Additionally, approximately twenty percent of the states’ high 
courts have mandatory appellate jurisdiction.221 Thus, in contrast to 
the docket of the Supreme Court, which is almost wholly 
discretionary, claimants are guaranteed to receive review by a court of 
final review. This aspect of state constitutional law could be beneficial 
to environmental plaintiffs because it requires courts to examine the 
merits of their claim (assuming it is not dismissed on procedural 
grounds) and issue a final ruling. Although this by no means implies a 
favorable result, environmental plaintiffs will be able to learn from 
these rulings and improve their claims moving forward, increasing the 
probability of success in the future. 
Furthermore, when state courts interpret their constitutions, their 
decisions are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. This power—
which the founders deemed essential to a federalist system of 
government by the founders222—makes state courts the final authority 
 
 218.  PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 219.  See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1973) (determining the 
Environmental Rights Amendment only applied to the state’s management of public natural 
resources) overruled by PEDF v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2015) 
(dismantling the Payne v. Kassab test after determining it stripped the constitutional provision 
of its meaning).  
 220.  See Sutton, supra note 36, at 20 (suggesting federal courts allow state courts to work 
their way through the constitutional issues under their own similarly worded constitutions, after 
which the federal courts can assess the states’ experiences in developing its own tests and rules). 
 221.  See id. at 19 n.50 (listing the states that permit direct appeal to the Supreme Court and 
those that provide appeals of right when a trial court declares a statute unconstitutional). 
 222.  See California Constitution Center, The Role of a State High Court at the Intersection 
of Federalism and State Sovereignty, SCOCABLOG (Apr. 15, 2015), http://scocablog.com/ 
the-role-of-a-state-high-court-at-the-intersection-of-federalism-and-state-sovereignty/ 
(“That founding principle necessarily contemplates some conflict between two roughly 
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on their constitutions. Thus, for example, if Wisconsin’s Supreme 
Court found that its constitution’s due process clause protected the 
right to particular climate conditions, that decision would be immune 
from review by the United States Supreme Court. 
E. State Constitutional Law Facilitates the Development of Federal 
Constitutional Law 
Bringing rights-based climate change litigation under state 
constitutions may facilitate the development of federal constitutional 
law in the future. As mentioned previously, state courts have much 
more freedom to experiment than their federal counterparts. Over 
time, the wisdom of these ideas (or lack thereof) will become 
apparent and may serve as a model for other states and the federal 
courts. This not only promotes better constitutional lawmaking, but 
also aligns with the experience of history, as much of the Bill of Rights 
was adopted from preexisting state constitutional guarantees.223 Thus, 
although the widespread success of an innovative right is not 
guaranteed, more rights may have the opportunity to succeed or fail if 
they are brought in state courts. 
In the context of climate change, state constitutional law may hold 
the possibility of ultimately achieving Juliana’s desired goal: 
constitutionalizing a federal right to an environment capable of 
sustaining life. Although such results would not be immediate, 
undergoing this sort of Darwinist process—observing the relative 
success of different states in implementing environmental rights—may 
benefit the plaintiffs by refining their litigation strategies and 
providing the Supreme Court evidence of broad legal support for 
asserting the requested right. 
F. State Courts Often Have Lower Jurisdictional Barriers 
In 51 Imperfect Solutions, Judge Sutton laments the outsized 
influence of federal law on state courts. He writes, “[f]or too long we 
have lived in a top-down constitutional world, in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court announces a ruling, and the state supreme courts 
move in lockstep in construing the counterpart guarantees of their 
own constitutions.”224 This trend, however, is not universal. Some state 
 
equivalent actors, rather than a master-servant relationship.”). 
 223.  Sutton, supra note 36, at 20. 
 224.  Id. 
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courts have considerably lower barriers to justiciability than federal 
courts.225 
Regarding standing, less than half the states have adopted Lujan’s 
three element test in full.226 Many have chosen instead to conform 
their standing requirements to the demands of their own state 
constitutions.227 This discrepancy results in many different analyses, 
some of which may help climate change litigants. For example, 
Alabama generally applies Lujan’s three element analysis, but the 
court has an exception for public interest standing, by which parties 
can enter Alabama courts if they can “show that they are seeking to 
require a public officer to perform a legal duty in which the public has 
an interest.”228 The applicability of such an exception to Juliana is 
intuitive, as the plaintiffs’ central claim is that state officers failed to 
adequately protect their civil rights by enabling GHG emissions.229 
Apropos political questions, the landscape is even more favorable. 
State courts frequently weigh in on questions that would be 
nonjusticiable under federal law,230 including decisions involving fiscal 
matters, budgetary management, and claims regarding the proper 
allocation of government services.231 This amenability bodes well for 
climate change litigants bringing rights-based claims in state courts. 
G. Conclusions on Rights Innovation at the State Level 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, state courts are uniquely 
situated to engage in the sort of rights innovation advocated by the 
plaintiffs in Juliana. Their amenability to change, regional character, 
and sheer numbers greatly increase the plaintiffs’ odds of success. 
There are, however, some valid concerns regarding state-based 
environmental activism. 
 
 225.  See generally Hershkoff, supra note 200, at 1833 (surveying state standards of 
justiciability). 
 226.  See Sassman, supra note 200, at 353. 
 227.  See id. at 353 n.16. 
 228.  Id. at 355 (quoting State ex rel. Alabama Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at 
*16–19 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 229.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016). 
 230.  See Hershkoff, supra note 200, at 1863 (“[S]tate common law courts do tend to hear an 
array of questions that would be nonjusticiable under federal law.”). 
 231.  See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997) (rejecting the 
government’s political question defense in a public education case by asserting “[w]e refuse to 
undermine our role as judicial arbiters and to pass our responsibilities onto the lap of the 
General Assembly”). 
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IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE 
Although climate change plaintiffs should have greater odds of 
successfully bringing rights-based claims in state courts,232 doing so is 
not without its challenges. State courts have limited jurisdictions and 
unique political climates, which makes litigating in them individually a 
daunting task. Additionally, just as the federalist system provides hope 
for climate change litigants, it also presents problems. Primarily, the 
ability of states to regulate is limited by the supremacy of federal law. 
Finally, whether localized emissions will be substantial enough to 
establish causation for individualized harms is an open question. 
A. The Urgency of Collective Action 
The IPCC report makes clear that without urgent, collective 
action, the planet will soon begin suffering from the effects of climate 
change.233 The approach advocated above may seem to run counter to 
achieving this goal. In contrast to bringing claims under the federal 
constitution in federal court, state-based rights would require litigants 
to find fifty different plaintiffs, bring their claims in fifty different 
jurisdictions, and litigate them under fifty different state constitutions. 
Each would require an investment of time and money, and despite 
their amenability to rights-based claims, some state courts may still 
reject the plaintiffs’ claims. These realities will slow the progress of 
climate change litigants, perhaps leading some to question whether 
such an approach is worthy of the resources required to pursue it. 
These difficulties, however daunting, should not prevent activists 
from pursuing state-based rights claims. First, incremental success is 
better than none. Environmental activists frequently make a similar 
argument when responding to arguments that reducing emissions in 
the United States will not prevent climate change if India and China 
continue to emit at greater rates.234 Following this logic, the existence 
 
 232.  See supra Part III (arguing rights-innovation is more likely to take place in state courts 
than in federal courts). 
 233.  See IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 7 (“Reaching and sustaining net zero global 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions and declining net non-CO2 radiative forcing would halt 
anthropogenic global warming on multi-decadal time scales.”). 
 234.  David Bookbinder, Chief Counsel, Niskansen Center, Address at The Federalist 
Society National Lawyers Convention: Climate Change Nuisance Suits (Nov. 17, 2018), 
https://fedsoc.org/conferences/2018-national-lawyers-convention#agenda-item-climate-change-
nuisance-suits (questioning the value of suppressing economic growth to prevent GHG 
emissions in view of China and India’s growing emissions outputs).  
SHARP_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  3:13 PM 
2019] STEPPING INTO THE BREACH 71 
of emissions in Kentucky should not prevent Ohio from protecting 
the rights of its citizens as protected by its state constitution. 
Additionally, the costs of litigating in individual states can be 
mitigated by employing the resources of local organizations 
concerned with the impacts of climate change. For example, many 
national environmental organizations, such as Sierra Club, have local 
chapters.235 These chapters could recruit experienced litigators in their 
state to represent their interests in state court. Thus, although 
certainly a worthy concern, the insufficiency and expense of making 
rights-based claims under individual state constitutions should not 
dissuade climate change litigants. 
B. The Supremacy of Federal Law 
In declaring the “Laws of the United States” to be “the Supreme 
Law of the Land,”236 the Constitution provides that where state and 
federal laws conflict, federal law will prevail.237 Federal environmental 
regulation arguably represents the most expansive assertion of federal 
authority;238 thus ample opportunity for conflict exists. For example, 
the Clean Air Act empowers the Environmental Protection Agency to 
regulate air pollution from motor vehicles; thus, states are generally 
barred from regulating car emissions.239 This and similar regulations, in 
view of the Supremacy Clause, limit the ability of states to reduce 
carbon emissions. 
Yet, federal environmental regulation is not all-encompassing and 
there are many actions states can take to reduce GHG emissions. 
Enshrining environmental rights in state constitutions, and proving 
the violation thereof, would compel states to use these mechanisms 
when they can. In fact, such suits would likely be more effective than 
 
 235.  For a list of Sierra Club’s local chapters, see https://www.sierraclub.org/chapters. 
 236.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 237.  See Johnathan H. Adler, When Is Two A Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action On 
State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 82 (2007) (reminding readers 
that under the Supremacy Clause, the federal government has authority to preempt contrary 
state laws). 
 238.  See id. at 87 (stating that the environmental portions of the U.S. Code grant expansive 
regulatory authority to federal agencies). 
 239.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) (preempting state automobile emissions 
standards); 
Nicholas Bryner & Meredith Hankins, Why California Gets to Write its Own Auto Emissions 
Standards: 5 Questions Answered, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://theconversation.com/why-california-gets-to-write-its-own-auto-emissions-standards-5-
questions-answered-94379 (discussing the history and purpose of the Clean Air Act in allowing 
California to govern its own emissions standards). 
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much of the litigation brought by environmental activists in recent 
years. Recall Bellon, in which the plaintiffs sought to induce the State 
of Washington into regulating five oil refineries operating there.240 The 
Ninth Circuit ruled the plaintiffs failed to establish standing, and thus 
never reached the underlying claims,241 but the activists driving that 
case must have believed it was worth the time and resources 
expended to litigate it. 
How much more valuable, then, would a state constitutional right 
that compels a state to regulate all its carbon emissions under its 
authority be to their cause? The aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Buck v. Bell242 provides a useful parallel here. In that 
infamous decision, the Supreme Court declined to recognize 
involuntary sterilization as a violation of the Due Process Clause.243 
Some state courts, however, had interpreted their state constitutions 
as prohibiting this reprehensible practice.244 In doing so, state 
constitutions protected individual rights where their federal 
counterpart was silent. They could do so again in the climate context. 
C. The Inadequacy of State-Level Emissions to Prove Causation 
One final difficulty is worthy of note: state emissions levels may 
make proving causation more challenging. In Bellon, the plaintiffs 
failed to establish standing because the court did not find the 
emissions of the five refineries at issue—which constituted 
approximately five percent of the state’s total—to be substantial 
enough to have caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.245 Even in Juliana, 
where the plaintiffs are challenging the emissions of the entire United 
States, the court insinuated they may face difficulty in proving 
causation.246 Thus, it is plausible that plaintiffs challenging the 
 
 240.  See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 113, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 241.  See id. at 1147 (determining that because the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements 
of Article II standing, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ arguments on 
the merits). 
 242.  274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 243.  See id. at 207 (holding the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid states from 
sterilizing the cognitively disabled). 
 244.  See, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 690–91 (D. Nev. 1918) (invalidating a forced-
sterilization order under the State of Nevada’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment[]”). 
 245.  See Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1147 (determining the plaintiffs failed to establish standing 
because they could not show that decreasing the refineries’ emission would redress their harms). 
 246.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1269 (acknowledging the effects of 
regulating U.S. emission may be scientifically discernible, but declining to dismiss on this ground 
citing the early stage of the litigation). 
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emissions of individual states will face challenges in proving causation 
as well. 
For several reasons, however, this challenge should not dissuade 
climate change litigants. First, Bellon stands only for the proposition 
that a fraction of a state’s emissions is insufficient to establish 
standing;247 plaintiffs in rights-based claims would presumably 
challenge their states’ aggregate emissions.248 Second, as noted above, 
standing analysis in state courts is often more relaxed than in federal 
courts. Thus, climate change litigants may be able to more easily 
surpass the causation requirement by assuming standing via public 
interest exceptions or other applicable provisions.249 Finally, science’s 
ability to attribute specific weather events—droughts, wildfires, and 
more—to global warming is constantly improving.250 Thus, a future 
where the experts are capable of tying state-level emissions to 
individual injuries is conceivable. 
D. sConclusions on the Inadequacy of State-Level Claims 
Concerns that state-level rights claims are inadequate in view of 
the magnitude of climate change are well founded; climate change will 
not be mitigated by the action of a single state. Few would argue, 
however, that reducing the emissions of one state is valueless. Every 
victory, however small, reduces global emissions levels, delaying, if 
only incrementally, the worst effects of climate change. Every delay 
offers the opportunity for more advocacy and the possibility of a 
global solution. In view of this, it is imperative that climate litigants 
make use of whatever avenues offer a possibility of success, and, as 
this Note has argued, state constitutional claims do just that. 
 
 247.  See id. at 1245 (distinguishing Juliana from Bellon by noting the disparity in the mass 
of the challenged emissions).  
 248.  See supra part I(A)(2) (discussing the difficulty climate litigants face in proving a 
causal relationship between emissions and global warming). Until climate science improves such 
that particular harms can be attributed to specific emissions, plaintiffs would be wise to 
challenge a jurisdictions aggregate emissions. They should do so in order to stand the best 
chance at proving the state’s emissions were a significant factor in causing the atmospheric 
conditions that harmed them.  
 249.  See supra note 228 and accompanying text (describing Alabama state law’s public 
interest exception to the Lujan test for standing).  
 250.  See Engel & Overpeck, supra note 82, at 25 (anticipating breakthroughs in climate 
science will fundamentally change causation analysis in the future); see also Attribution of 
Extreme Weather Events, supra note 83, at 13–16 (explaining scientists’ ability to attribute 
specific weather events to climate change has improved markedly in recent years). 
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CONCLUSION 
The young plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States face serious 
challenges in federal court. As has been discussed, these challenges 
begin at the jurisdictional level—establishing standing and avoiding 
raising a political question—and intensify as courts consider their 
expansive interpretation of the Due Process Clause. When assessed as 
a whole, these issues make success at the federal level doubtful at 
best. However, state constitutional law may offer an alternative path. 
Although obstacles certainly remain, state courts are more likely to 
hear climate plaintiffs’ claims on the merits and more likely to rule 
favorably upon them. Activists’ dissatisfaction, and even frustration, 
with being forced to take an incremental approach when addressing 
an issue as important as climate change is understandable, but climate 
change plaintiffs should avoid letting the perfect be the enemy of the 
good and consider whether victory may be found in better as well as 
best. 
 
